Generic Arts

The assumption gained considerable influence, in the UK and elsewhere, that the various art forms "naturally" comprise a generic community, unity, or family, for which there should be collective planning in the curriculum. This assumption constituted the explicit philosophical foundation and rationale of a four-year Research Report on The Arts in Schools1 , under the aegis of the National Curriculum Council. That was taken by many teachers to confer on the generic notion the status of a doctrine consecrated in tablets of authoritative stone. It was also very tempting politically on grounds of economic and administrative convenience, because it implied that there was no need for separate arts subjects - visual arts, music, drama, dance, - but either that there could be a single "arts" subject in the curriculum, or that only one art form would be sufficient to provide students with their "aesthetic education".

At first sight it may seem that the issue amounts merely to a verbal quibble over the meaning of "generic", but it is dangerously false to assume that this question is a mere definitional quibble, for it is of incalculable practical significance for the arts in education. It can be sharply clarified by focussing on the generic notion, but it can be stated in terms which show clearly that it is by no means a mere verbal quibble. On the contrary, it amounts to such crucial questions as: Are there any sound artistic and educational grounds (as opposed to administrative convenience) for a general, collective policy for the arts?; Do the arts exhibit characteristics which are common to them all and which together make them distinct from any other discipline in the curriculum?; Are there any grounds for contention that there is a "natural affinity" or "cognate relationship" between the arts such that integrated or combined work between arts subjects is more appropriate than between an art and a non-art subject?

These questions require careful philosophical analysis. In the UK the "generic" tide was sweeping the country, and it was particularly convenient for politicians that those proposing the generic thesis were arts educators. Fortunately, the arguments against generic arts eventually prevailed, and we now, at least, have art and music as separate subjects, (although, sadly, the other principal art forms are subsumed under other subjects).

However, the battle is not yet completely won. In some local education authorities there is a single inspector of the arts, replacing separate inspectors for each art subject. And in individual schools policy for the arts is still sometimes organised along the generic lines proposed by the Arts in Schools Research Project. The Principal of a College for Teacher Education which I visited was seriously proposing the economy of closing the visual arts department on the grounds that the students "aesthetic education" was adequately provided by dance. In another such college, the generic thesis of the Arts in Schools Project was cited as providing the authoritative philosophical rationale for a proposed new arts degree, in which it was affirmed, with approval: "the days of the separate arts disciplines in schools are numbered".

The generic is a prime example of an issue which is unavoidably philosophical, and which has crucial practical implications for curriculum policy for the arts. It was because a superficially plausible thesis was not examined philosophically that there have been damaging consequences for the arts; and it was only philosophical intervention which prevented those consequences from being much more seriously damaging.

The common tendency to suppose a gulf between philosophy and practice is not only absurd, but dangerously so. All teaching is inevitably the expression of some philosophy or other, even if it be implicit and imposed from on high. It is much healthier to make that philosophy explicit so that teachers can question it and decide for themselves whether it is the best approach for their students. The opposite of theory is not practice but brain death.

Central questions

There are three straightforward questions to be asked about the generic contention: [a] What is meant by "generic"? [b] Are there any valid reasons for claiming that the arts are generic, i.e. comprise a genus? [c] What are the practical educational and artistic implications?

(The Arts in Schools Project, during its four years, never confronted these questions. Its whole case was founded on unexamined assumptions, and neither it, nor any other proponent of the generic thesis, has been able to state explicitly what are its practical implications. It survived largely because of the vague, evasive, and confused formulation of the generic/combined arts thesis.)

To clarify the issue, consider three main definitions of "generic", from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, and from Webster's: these are the definitions cited by generic theorists. Note at the outset that only the first can give the generic theorists what they want, yet it carries such unacceptable - or unintelligible - consequences that they deny that this is what they mean. And, to repeat, the question is emphatically not one of trivial definitional quibbling: there are crucial issues of substance here, for curriculum policy for the arts.

Definition 1: common and distinct

According to the Oxford Dictionary, the meaning of "generic" is most clearly exemplified in zoology or botany: "a group of animals or plants having common structural characteristics distinct from those of all other groups". (My italics.) In this sense to refer to phenomena as generic, i.e. species of the same genus, is to say that they exhibit common and distinct structural characteristics. Note carefully: common and distinct. That is, in this sense, which is what the generic theorists need to support their case, generic phenomena must have characteristics which are common to all of them, and which make them distinct from all other phenomena.

That the arts cannot intelligibly be regarded as generic in this sense can immediately be revealed by considering unequivocal cases. Hawks fall into the category of a genus. Are the arts similarly generic? Obviously not. There is no parallel relationship between, on one hand, eagles, buzzards and kestrels, and, on the other hand, music, drama and painting. More precise examples of plants or animals which constitute species of the same genus reveal even more clearly the unintelligibility of the supposition that the various works and forms of art constitute a genus.

The philosophical incoherence and educational/artistic dangers of the generic contention on this definition (Def.1) can be clearly exposed in the schema below. Each species of a genus, properly so-called, has common structural characteristics:

Genus |
____________________
|	|	|	|
S1	S2	S3	S4

To understand the structure of Species 1, is ipso facto to understand the structure of all the other species of the same genus. That is what is meant by a generic similarity. Thus it is necessary to acquire an understanding of the structure of only one of the species of a genus in order to understand the general structure of all the species of that genus. This reveals unmistakably the unintelligibility of the contention that all the art works from the various art forms are similarly generic, i.e. species of the same genus. An understanding of the structure of Bach's Goldberg Variations has no relevance to understanding the structure of Botticelli's Primavera, Martha Graham's Appallachian Spring, a Shakespeare sonnet, or Samuel Beckett's Happy Days. It is senseless to assume that if one understands music then one necessarily understands novels, poetry, choreography, sculpture etc. Indeed, even within the same art form the generic thesis makes no sense, as one can readily recognise when one considers very disparate historical periods and cultures.

The educational/artistic danger is, of course, that if the generic contention were intelligible and valid, then students would need to learn only one of the art forms in order to acquire this supposed general artistic understanding. Faced with this unavoidable logical consequence, the generic proponents usually vehemently deny that this is what they mean, but (a), as I shall show, they are logically committed to it; and (b) in any case they fail to explain clearly what the arts teacher is supposed to do, on the generic thesis. How on earth does one teach generic arts, as distinct from separate arts which can sometimes be combined ?

To repeat, it is important to recognise that on Def.1 the generic contention would entail this educationally dangerous notion of a general artistic understanding. The danger, as I have mentioned, is that on that basis educational policy-makers would be justified (by arts-educators!) in severely reducing the number of art forms taught in schools and colleges. When confronted with this consequence, the generic proponents usually agree that the notion of such a general artistic understanding is both senseless and educationally dangerous, but they attempt to evade that unpalatable consequence of their own thesis by denying that Def.1 is what they mean by "generic". Yet, as I shall show, this inevitably runs them into self-contradiction.

Moreover, their implicit, unwitting commitment to general artistic understanding is apparent when one considers the theorists to whom they refer for support. For example, The Arts in Schools Project1 explicitly and unquestioningly follows the philosophical framework of the Gulbenkian Report, The Arts in Schools2 . In that Report it is stated explicitly, often, that there is such a single category of understanding3. Indeed, this confused myth of a unified aesthetic or artistic mode of experience or understanding has very commonly been assumed by philosophers and educators.4 To cite two influential examples Sir Herbert Read5 and Paul Hirst6 make precisely this assumption about an aesthetic form of knowledge. Peter Abbs, a generic proponent who strongly denies that he is committed to the notion of a general artistic understanding, ironically reveals his unrecognised commitment to it, and therefore his self-contradictory position, when he cites The Arts in Schools7 approvingly as asserting that the arts "provide a unique kind of understanding" (my italics)8 . Note the singular. This is to embrace a general understanding. On this view any and all arts contribute to this supposed single kind of understanding, rather as the same muscle can be developed by any of various exercises.

The contention becomes even more obviously untenable if, as do most generic theorists, such as Abbs, the thesis be proposed in relation to aesthetic, by contrast with artistic, understanding or experience.

The persistent failure to recognise the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic invites potentially dangerous educational implications. For instance, Rod Taylor9 cites examples from Primary/Elementary Schools where the arts are regarded as unnecessary, since the children's "aesthetic education" can be acquired from experience on nature walks etc. And in the UK the Secretary of State for Education stated that art and music should be provided by all schools up the age of 14, and then "it is our view that all schools should offer some form of aesthetic experience in the curriculum for all 14-16 year-olds". Would it be sufficient to gaze at sunsets or autumn colours? This formulation indicates how potentially dangerous for the arts in education is the prevalent failure to distinguish aesthetic from artistic experience: it invites a reduction in provision for the arts.

It is surprising how many theorists continue unquestioningly to assume this misconceived notion of a single kind of aesthetic or artistic understanding. Yet, even prima facie it is highly implausible: it is difficult to see how it could be convincingly argued that one is developing an understanding, or having an experience, of the same kind, in learning to play the harp, learning to paint, learning to dance, learning to write poetry.

-

I have considered Definition 1 with care because it is the only definition, as I shall show, which could support the case for collective, unified, or integrated arts in general. But it also necessarily entails the consequence which generic proponents want to avoid, namely a general artistic understanding. In short, their arguments commit them to general artistic understanding, yet they try to evade that consequence. For to affirm that the arts constitute a generic unity IS to affirm the unintelligible and educationally dangerous notion of a general artistic understanding and experience; the same general structural characteristics.

The generic protagonists try to evade this disastrous logical commitment to general artistic understanding in the following ways:

Definition 2: common but not distinct

The usual ploy by which generic theorists try to evade that consequence is to omit the fatal "distinct" criterion of Definition 1, and to insist that by "generic" they mean only commonalities which are not distinct from other educational activities. Thus, for instance, in a symposium, the Director of the Project cited a second definition, according to which "generic" can refer simply to common characteristics, or similarities and likenesses in any respect; that is, they need not be distinct from any other group. But to adopt this stratagem in order to evade the fatal implication of general artistic understanding, is to jump out of the frying pan into the fire. For on this definition, the generic theorists have no case left at all. Their "generic" contention was supposed to provide a convincing rationale for the notion that the arts comprise a distinctive unity, and therefore that the arts should be considered collectively in the curriculum. Yet now they demolish their own case by affirming that there is nothing which distinguishes the arts as a special group. For example, Abbs10 says he means only "common characteristics" (p.182), and he quotes the Project approvingly: "The various arts disciplines have common characteristics and related roles in education. It follows that they should be planned for collectively, as a generic area of the whole curriculum." (My italics.)

It does not follow at all. That there are common characteristics does not in the least imply that they form a generic area, nor that they should be planned for collectively. Any two or more school subjects have common characteristics, but that does not in the least imply that they should be planned for together. Mathematics and music have common characteristics. Does that entail a collective policy, and that mathematics and music are "unified"? Appeal to commonalities implies nothing specific to the arts, since it applies to all subjects. Thus, it offers no support for the notion of the arts as comprising a unity.. To repeat, there are commonalities, similarities, likenesses in several respects, among any and all subjects. What the generic proponents need in order to support their case is precisely what they deny that they mean, namely Def. 1, i.e. common and distinct structural characteristics. They deny that they mean "generic" in the sense of Def. 1 because they want to avoid the disastrous consequence of general artistic understanding. But only Def. 1 could support the case for a "unified", or "collective" arts policy. Def. 2 offers no support whatsoever.

In short, the only substantial meaning of "generic" is Definition 1, which necessarily implies the notion of general artistic understanding, which is so fraught with dangers.

Common usage

The most plausible case for the supposed generic character of the arts is that common usage implies a unity. That is, because "art" is used to refer to all of them, it is assumed that there must be some common, essential unifying characteristic in all the activities called by that name.

It should be emphasised again that the belief in generic arts, or the arts as an essentially unified group, has gained credibility only because of such a superficially plausible but unquestioned assumption. For it is natural to assume that there must be some kind of essential unity in all the instances of use of the same term. But it is important to recognise that this is no more than an assumption. The trouble is that many people do not even think it is open to question, and then the disastrous consequences to which I have drawn attention seem to follow inevitably. As Wittgenstein has put it, the most important move in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we did not notice.

Wittgenstein's still remarkably misunderstood notion of family resemblances11 is crucial in this respect. He writes: "Consider for example the proceedings we call "games" - board games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: "There must be something in common, or they would not be called `games' - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all ... To repeat, don't think but look!" (My italics.)

The point is that where a general term such as "game" is used of a range of activities, we should not assume that there must be some essential, common, unifying characteristics: on the contrary, we should "look and see".

Similarly, it is a mistake to assume that common usage reveals that there must be an essential unity among the activities referred to as "art". We should look and see. And when we do look, without the blinkers of assumption, we discover that there are no essential, common characteristics which unify the arts. There is no set of common and essential characteristics in such various instances of art as Picasso's Guernica, Mozart's Fortieth Symphony, Shakespeare's Measure for Measure, the ballet Giselle, Spielberg's film Schindler's List, James Joyce's The Dead, and Sylvia Plath's poetry.

An advertisement for the various flavours in Lyon's World of Coffee, depicts three young sisters, with the caption: "Despite the family resemblances, they're actually very different."

So the appeal to common usage, as a purported support for the generic thesis, or for unified arts, turns out to be self-defeating. For it appears to succeed only if one accepts, not simply common usage, but an unwarranted assumption about what underlies that usage. If we simply look at the variety of ways in which the word "art" is used we can find no common essential quality. Thus, there is a simpler refutation, than via Wittgenstein, of the appeal to common usage of the term "art" as supposed support for the claim that the arts must form a unity or generic area. Consider some of those uses. What of the art of cooking, the art of teasing, the art of loving, even, the title of a book I once saw, The Womanly Art of Breast Feeding? Are they all generic?

This seems so obvious when pointed out that it is sometimes difficult to understand how the generic notion could have gained, and especially retained, any serious credibility. Indeed, a research student who decided to write a dissertation on the topic recently wrote to me to say just that, and to ask where she could find cogent arguments in favour of the generic case, since the positions of the leading generic theorists are based on unargued, if plausible, assumptions. The most plausible of these is the assumption we have just considered, namely that there must be some essential unifying "generic" characteristics, since all are called "art". But added force is provided, to administrators, by the consequent expediency of economies in teaching staff, timetable space and resources. Moreover, there are now people with a vested, or territorial, interest in maintaining the generic myth at all costs, who defend it with irrational doctrinal fervour. Since some of these people are prominent which is, presumably, why the myth persists, although its influence, in the UK, is now in marked - I hope terminal - decline. Unfortunately, in the UK at least, too many educators judge theories by the criteria of the status of those who propound them, rather than by those of inherent validity.12 It is an indictment of a dangerous tendency in our educational system, that charisma, status and rhetoric, usually for self-promotion, so often successfully conceal invalidity and vacuity. (There are many examples.)

Co-operation

It is important to be clear about another common assumption, or assertion, about the relationship between a general thesis of combined/integrated or generic arts, and co-operation among the various art forms. The Arts in Schools Project confuses this issue when it states, in relation to its championing of generic arts.13 "This is not to argue against the specialist teaching of different disciplines, but for greater co-operation between teachers..." But this is tendentious. The generic claim has nothing whatsoever to do with the merits of greater co-operation. One may, and I do, applaud the idea of enriching co-operation, combining different disciplines, without in the least subscribing to generic arts, or a collective policy for arts. Indeed, on the contrary, fruitful and educationally enriching co-operation is possible only where each art form is also pursued independently.

The particular case

This leads me to the most crucial positive aspect of my argument. What I wish to emphasise is the danger of distortion and superficiality inherent in a general thesis or assumption, for instance that combined or integrated enterprises are necessarily to be promoted, and that they should be promoted exclusively or at least predominantly among the arts. To repeat, it is the imposition of a general theory which I reject as invalid and educationally dangerous. My support for some co-operative, combined ventures relates not to a general thesis, but to particular cases. No valid reasons - and few reasons (as opposed to unargued assumptions) of any kind - have been adduced to show that co-operation among different art forms is any more "natural" or necessary than between an art form and a non-art form, or two non-art forms. Co-operative, inter-disciplinary ventures can be highly successful. But their educational value always depends upon the potential for enrichment of understanding for students which is inherent in particular cases, where working together from different disciplines offers really fruitful, imaginative educational enlightenment. No general, or "generic", thesis makes any sense here. To say that music, visual arts, drama and dance ought to go together in general, is as bizarre and untenable as saying that physical education and mathematics ought to go together in general. But, of course, in particular cases, it may well be educationally valid to have integrated work involving physical education and mathematics, or painting and music, or a science and drama.

At a recent International Music Conference, several speakers were arguing that music's closest natural affinity is with mathematics. The philosopher Leibniz described music in terms of music.

Verbal quibbling

I must emphasise again, since the issue has been misconstrued, that my rejection of the generic assumption is very far from being a mere verbal quibble over the meaning of "generic". On the contrary, this is a crucial issue of substance, concerning practical policy for the teaching of the arts. To make this absolutely clear, instead of in terms of the generic, the central issue can be formulated as follows:

No valid reasons have been offered: (a) which indicate the educational desirability of a collective arts policy; or (b) for regarding the arts as "unified", "a family", "cognate" etc. And it is difficult to imagine what any such reasons could be. Quite the contrary, the very varied character of the different art forms reveals that there are no more grounds for putting them together in general than for any other general grouping of subjects. (They could, of course, be grouped together for administrative convenience. But that is quite different. I am concerned to show that there are no valid educational or artistic grounds for a collective policy.)

Conclusion

My main positive thesis is that it is the general theory of generic/unified arts which is both senseless and potentially dangerous and distorting. Such a theory implies or explicitly contends that somehow the arts belong together; that combining arts is somehow more "natural" than combining an art form with non-art subject; that there is a supposed general artistic understanding or ability which can be acquired by experience of any one art form; and that the distinct art forms can somehow be adequately learned in an exclusively combined/integrated context. Small wonder that such a contention is so dangerously popular with politicians and administrators. It would save money, but so far as one can make sense of it at all, it would lead to an arts ghetto, where nothing substantial was achieved in any of the arts. There is no good reason why the arts should be expediently corralled together.

This is not in the least to denigrate combined or multi-media work: on the contrary. But educationally and artistically fruitful combined ventures derive from an adequate education in independent disciplines. This applies not only to the arts. The supposition or imposition of a general theory is bogus: it is philosophically invalid and educationally damaging. Co-operative, combined work can certainly be enriching, exciting, and educationally fruitful: but only in particular cases, according to the professional judgement of teachers. There is nothing special about the arts in this respect: co-operative work may involve an art form and a non-art discipline, or non-arts disciplines, as well as art forms only.

Indeed, where each art form has an independent status in the curriculum, this is likely to encourage a greater degree of educationally enriching combined work; for in that case the potential for co-operative ventures is not implicitly or explicitly limited to other art forms, but can extend across all the subjects in the curriculum. One has seen some strikingly unexpected, imaginative and exciting examples initiated by perceptive and skilled teachers.

To repeat my emphasis: the value and intelligibility of integrated work will always depend ultimately on particular cases. It will depend, as all education ought to depend, primarily upon the informed professional judgement of teachers who are expert in their particular fields, as to whether and when it is educationally enlightening to work with other subjects, whether arts or non-arts: it will depend upon our having confidence in well-educated teachers. They are in the best position to make sound decisions about the value of working collectively with other disciplines.